I was chatting with a family member over the weekend about climate change, which is never pretty as I try (often in vain) to compete with the Herald Sun. Nevertheless, being a researcher I felt it necessary to explain differences between opinion and evidence based conclusions. Don't get me wrong; I agree that even research is subjective and researchers must outline the methods and madness in their conclusions. I am also reminded, as I read Michael Chamberlain's book, that science is a human art. Nevertheless, I believe there is value in research method and so I leapt head first into my persuasive task. All major science associations in industrialised countries, I prosthelytised, and almost all scientists agree on three conclusions; that temperatures are rising, that humans are contributing to that rise, and that the long term consequences of this rise are pretty bad. Still, my relative replied, isn't that just 'their opinion'? Not in the world of research, I explained. Conclusions must have some kind of evidence base. We take years exploring a problem, gathering evidence, and writing it up. Even then, our work is not published until it is competitively scrutinised by a group of our peers to whom we must make available our raw data for inspection. We cannot imply causality if the evidence indicates only correlation. Add to this, I said, that in the field of climate science there are thousands upon thousands of these papers that have been published, across decades, in different countries, under different political and funding regimes. My explanation made an impact. However we are unlikely to hear these distinctions made by the Herald Sun or Tony Abbott any time soon. I agree that everyone is entitled to their own opinion; however, as the saying goes, everyone is not entitled to their own facts. And so it is that many readers of the Herald Sun without research experience are led to believe that an opinion column by Andrew Bolt is the same thing as the conclusions drawn by thousands of climate scientists around the world. To my mind, this is a sad thing.
The relationship between expertise, evidence, and asylum seeker policy in Australia has enjoyed its own set of difficulties. Notable academics, writers, and community sector leaders have consistently challenged misrepresentations of and inaccurate information about asylum seekers propelled by government, opposition, and the press (Clyne 2005, Marr 2006, ASRC 2012, O'Brien 2012). These misrepresentations have commonly served to dehumanise and delegitimise asylum seekers, leading to policy outcomes that circumvent or undermine their rights. The Prime Minister's recent appointment of an 'Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers' has only served to muddy the waters further. A significant base of independent and evidence based research about asylum already exists in the community, much of which supports policy outcomes antithetical to those that have been proposed by consecutive governments (see for example Pickering 2012, The Conversation 2012, submissions to the Expert Panel, etc). In this context, what kind of 'expertise' was it expected that a hand picked panel could bring. I should like to qualify my comments in this article by stating that I consider each of the 'Expert Panel' members to have unquestionable expertise in their relevant fields, as also recognised in their public honours. However I think it is incumbent upon us to interrogate the relationship between the kinds of expertise included on the panel, and the question of what kinds of expertise that might be relevant to resolving a complex policy equation around asylum seekers.
It is probably best to begin by considering the problem to which we must bring this expertise. In its terms of reference the 'Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers' was tasked with providing, 'advice and recommendations to the Government on policy options available, and in its considered opinion, the efficacy of such options, to prevent asylum seekers risking their lives on dangerous boat journeys to Australia'. This is one of many articulations of the asylum 'problem' over consecutive governments. Under Howard, and especially after 9/11, the 'asylum problem' was variously represented in relation to concerns about border control and security, in relation to individuals accused of disregarding the law (by being 'illegal'), by disregarding 'core' Australian values of fairness and civility (Clyne 2005), and as a concern about the affects of unsuccessful integration (Oxfam 2007, Caldwell 2007). The post 9/11 security frenzy around asylum seekers (being potential terrorists) ultimately proved to be a government beat up (less than 1% of arrivals have an adverse security report) and the concept of queues has been widely contested, although the exaggerated and xenophobic concerns about integration re-appear periodically. And it is never illegal to claim asylum as a refugee. Labor has sought to differentiate its articulation of 'the problem' from the Liberals. For example, it has placed greater emphasis on the demonisation and punishment of people smugglers (Aly 2012), much like punishing drug traffickers and pimps. But even the blanket demonisation of people smugglers has been criticised, as has been the rather tyrannical incarceration of the few low level and powerless smugglers who are caught. After Gillard's ascension, there was a noticeable change in articulation of the asylum problem to a concern about drownings.
Common to these diverse expressions of 'the asylum problem' has been the relatively consistent policy approach of 'deterrence'. The pursuit of deterrence has manifested variously in mandatory and remote detention measures, offshore processing, TPVs/restriction on family reunion rights, and limiting protection triggers, such as excising land from Australia's migration zone and turning boats around. This is notwithstanding some amelioration of the harsher measures by Rudd. My question is how such diverse articulations of a policy problem can seemingly result in such a consistent set of policy measures; how different problems all lead to the same answer. I am not the first to ask this question, and asylum is far from the first policy area to which it applies. The 'solution' of a US and allied invasion of Iraq was problematised first in relation to weapons of mass destruction, then the harbouring of Al Qaeda terrorists, then the importance of freeing Iraqi people from a dictator. It is easy to be cynical in such circumstances that some pre-ordained, politically popular solution takes first order over any perceived policy problem. Australian commentators have argued that asylum is a wedge issue from which neither side of politics can afford to recoil. Parties appealing to conservative voters poll better when taking 'tough' action against perceived rule breakers (e.g. asylum seekers, criminals, etc). In parliament this week, Melissa Parke MP lamented the current 'race to the base' by both sides of politics. 'I reflect with great disappointment that this area of policy has been dealt with . . . in a way that represents a very low ebb in the tides of Australian politics and public policy. The discussion has often been so full of distortion and misrepresentation and fear mongering and point scoring . . . that it cannot be called a debate. And to the extent that we regard this outcome as a compromise, it is still a compromise at the lower end of what we are capable of as a nation'.
It is in light of this political context that the question of expertise and evidence must be examined - beginning with the government's choice of membership for its expert panel; Angus Houston, retired Chief of the Defence Force, Michael L'Estrange, Director of the National Security College at ANU, and Paris Aristotle, a founding Director of the Victorian Foundation for Survivors of Torture and Trauma. That an expert from defence was appointed to chair the panel creates a significant symbolic boundary around the discussion. Two of the three panel members bring expertise in security and defence. By virtue of the panel's membership, the problem of drownings, or solutions to it, are anticipated to require expertise in defence or security. This is not to negate any other skills and experience of panel members; nor to deny defence and security implications in the asylum debate. However Bacchi (1989) has argued that problem representation in policy - the likes of this panel's terms of reference - contains an implicit diagnosis of the solution. As Marston (2004: 93) puts it, 'The rationale for . . . reforms is constructed retrospectively to suit predetermined solutions, while at the same time contributing to the symbolic power of the State Government - a competent body of decision makers tackling hard . . . problems'. I want to suggest that the Expert Panel's terms of reference and its membership imply a heavily bounded solution; and indeed, a solution consistent with government's previous penchant for deterrence.
In considering the panel's description as 'expert', it is also useful to examine who or what was absent from its membership and/or its radar. If some correlation can be drawn between panel membership and outcomes, then the 'solution' to drownings was certainly not envisaged in terms of human rights practice, international law, or other pivotal areas of practice in the refugee field. For example, it would surely make sense to have included a human rights legal expert, given recent success of the High Court challenge to the Malaysia solution. The panel could also arguably have benefited from a candidate with knowledge and expertise of the push and pull factors in asylum. Or one with operational and political experience drawn from working in refugee camps. Here I am not making specific recommendations as to omissions; rather it is noteworthy to reflect on the symbolic and, ultimately, the political power of those omissions.
Presumably because it found areas of expertise or evidence unavailable to it, the panel recommended that 'that the incompleteness of the current evidence base on asylum issues be addressed through a well-managed and adequately funded research program engaging government and non-government expertise' (Rec 22). Funding for more comprehensive research is of course a welcome finding. However there has been little recognition from government or the panel of an already existing body of knowledge. Experts on refugee matters from the academy and from the community sector have worked hard to share their findings in respected journals and various popular and online media. It would be fair to suggest that the settlement services sector has increasingly been influenced by, and availed itself, of research and research practitioners. The Conversation recently advertised an initiative to collate relevant refugee research in a database. It is thus of concern that in assessing the relative influence of 'push' and 'pull' factors in asylum, the expert panel described its approach as 'more a matter of judgment than science'. All policy is premised on judgment, some moreso than others . However in a mature democracy one would hope that, amongst other sources of information, politicians would turn to their institutions of research and knowledge from which to garner evidence to inform their decisions. Not so where boat arrivals are at issue.
Recent governments have demonstrated an antipathy toward research from the sector where it conflicts with policy frameworks. I call this the 'Galileo effect'; that is, relevant research has at times been ignored, dismissed, or maligned when it does not conform with the hegemony of government policy. Take, for example, the work of Louise Newman, now Professor of Developmental Psychiatry and Director of the Monash University Centre for Developmental Psychiatry & Psychology. Professor Newman has spoken publicly about the pressure placed on her, and her colleagues, following their research into the negative mental health impacts of detention on asylum seekers (see for example Steel, ZP, Mares, S, Newman, L, Blick, B & Dudley, MJ, 2004) . Colleagues warned Newman that her field of study was the equivalent of career suicide. Her credibility and her methods of research were attacked during the term of the Howard government in a bid to undermine her findings. As Newman explained it, she was simply following the evidence; but, as Gore puts it, hers was an inconvenient truth. Consecutive governments have enthusiastically propagated disparaging representations of asylum seekers before seeking the facts or evidence (Riemer 2012). Throwing children into the water was a 'fact' until an inquiry drawing on meticulous research documented evidence to the contrary; although not until after Howard's re-election. Only this week there have been more unsubstantiated reports of aberrant asylum seeker behaviour. The inaccurate allegations were refuted and corrected by the captain of the relevant vessel. It would seem that only certain types of expertise are desirable where asylum seekers are concerned and sometimes, none at all.
Most regrettably, the voices of refugees are relatively absent from this debate, despite its serious implications for their lives (and possible deaths); both government and the sector must continue to meet the challenge of self reflection and reform in decision making practices which exclude the very people for whom they are acting 'in best interests'. Why was there not a former refugee on the panel? (Gillard has repeatedly referred to Aristotle as a refugee when he is not). Or one might ask a woman, given that most refugees globally are women and their children? Whose experience counts in the government's decision making process?
How else did expertise figure in this panel's decision making? We know that the panel received over 300 submissions from individuals and organisations, many of whom have significant experience and expertise in the refugee sector. A list of those consulted by the panel is included in the appendices. Much of this expertise arises from individuals and organisations who have direct engagement with refugee communities; people working at the coal face with individuals and families who, over the past fifteen years, have been living with the consequences of the prevailing 'solutions' of deterrence. An evidence base that arises from case management provides a chilling picture of the very human effects of policy making; such specific knowledge was of course also vested with the third member of the panel, Mr Paris Aristotle. The pivotal and vanguard services of Foundation House, which address the mental health needs of refugees, are a continuing legacy of Mr Aristotle's contribution to the sector. Given his experience, Mr Aristotle was much sought after by the media following delivery of the panel's controversial recommendations.
Despite his credentials, it would be inaccurate to suggest that Mr Aristotle's voice on the panel represented the preponderance of views from the sector. This is not to attack his motives, nor the drivers for his decision making (Gordon 2012). However the recommendations articulated in key refugee and human rights sector submissions (see for example ASRC, RILC, HRLC, RAN, etc) stand in stark contrast to the overwhelming number of panel recommendations; recommendations defended by Mr Aristotle. The absence of a submission to the panel from Foundation House, a key and long established refugee service provider, is also noteworthy. There could be no conflict of interest in such a submission, given the public nature of Aristotle's foundation role and directorship, and his being only one of a three member panel; although any contribution by Foundation House was unlikely to have materially affected the already bounded nature of the debate. The policy of deterrence was extended.
Appointment of the 'Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers' has proved a useful springboard from which to consider the issue of expertise and evidence in the asylum debate. Gillard's application of the term 'expert' to her panel was likely intended to convey a sense of 'competent' government tackling the 'hard problem' of boat people (Marston 2004); however the panel's regard for the current evidence base is unclear. It may well be that a greater body of evidence around refugee issues is required, for example in relation to refugee flows; however the evidence base around the affects of detention, for example, is already clear and compelling (APS 2012, AHRC 2012). One might be forgiven for thinking that the government tends to overlook expertise that does not suit its policy preferences (Riemer 2012). In the case of the Expert Panel, government has structured a process likely to deliver a solution of its anticipation; because frankly, to frame an inquiry in relation to preventing boat journeys, and then to resource it primarily with a defence and security expert, is to imply the solution to the problem (Bacchi 1999). Gillard may have appointed a panel with expertise, but its recommendations, by and large, did not reflect expert views from the sector.
It is probably best to begin by considering the problem to which we must bring this expertise. In its terms of reference the 'Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers' was tasked with providing, 'advice and recommendations to the Government on policy options available, and in its considered opinion, the efficacy of such options, to prevent asylum seekers risking their lives on dangerous boat journeys to Australia'. This is one of many articulations of the asylum 'problem' over consecutive governments. Under Howard, and especially after 9/11, the 'asylum problem' was variously represented in relation to concerns about border control and security, in relation to individuals accused of disregarding the law (by being 'illegal'), by disregarding 'core' Australian values of fairness and civility (Clyne 2005), and as a concern about the affects of unsuccessful integration (Oxfam 2007, Caldwell 2007). The post 9/11 security frenzy around asylum seekers (being potential terrorists) ultimately proved to be a government beat up (less than 1% of arrivals have an adverse security report) and the concept of queues has been widely contested, although the exaggerated and xenophobic concerns about integration re-appear periodically. And it is never illegal to claim asylum as a refugee. Labor has sought to differentiate its articulation of 'the problem' from the Liberals. For example, it has placed greater emphasis on the demonisation and punishment of people smugglers (Aly 2012), much like punishing drug traffickers and pimps. But even the blanket demonisation of people smugglers has been criticised, as has been the rather tyrannical incarceration of the few low level and powerless smugglers who are caught. After Gillard's ascension, there was a noticeable change in articulation of the asylum problem to a concern about drownings.
Common to these diverse expressions of 'the asylum problem' has been the relatively consistent policy approach of 'deterrence'. The pursuit of deterrence has manifested variously in mandatory and remote detention measures, offshore processing, TPVs/restriction on family reunion rights, and limiting protection triggers, such as excising land from Australia's migration zone and turning boats around. This is notwithstanding some amelioration of the harsher measures by Rudd. My question is how such diverse articulations of a policy problem can seemingly result in such a consistent set of policy measures; how different problems all lead to the same answer. I am not the first to ask this question, and asylum is far from the first policy area to which it applies. The 'solution' of a US and allied invasion of Iraq was problematised first in relation to weapons of mass destruction, then the harbouring of Al Qaeda terrorists, then the importance of freeing Iraqi people from a dictator. It is easy to be cynical in such circumstances that some pre-ordained, politically popular solution takes first order over any perceived policy problem. Australian commentators have argued that asylum is a wedge issue from which neither side of politics can afford to recoil. Parties appealing to conservative voters poll better when taking 'tough' action against perceived rule breakers (e.g. asylum seekers, criminals, etc). In parliament this week, Melissa Parke MP lamented the current 'race to the base' by both sides of politics. 'I reflect with great disappointment that this area of policy has been dealt with . . . in a way that represents a very low ebb in the tides of Australian politics and public policy. The discussion has often been so full of distortion and misrepresentation and fear mongering and point scoring . . . that it cannot be called a debate. And to the extent that we regard this outcome as a compromise, it is still a compromise at the lower end of what we are capable of as a nation'.
It is in light of this political context that the question of expertise and evidence must be examined - beginning with the government's choice of membership for its expert panel; Angus Houston, retired Chief of the Defence Force, Michael L'Estrange, Director of the National Security College at ANU, and Paris Aristotle, a founding Director of the Victorian Foundation for Survivors of Torture and Trauma. That an expert from defence was appointed to chair the panel creates a significant symbolic boundary around the discussion. Two of the three panel members bring expertise in security and defence. By virtue of the panel's membership, the problem of drownings, or solutions to it, are anticipated to require expertise in defence or security. This is not to negate any other skills and experience of panel members; nor to deny defence and security implications in the asylum debate. However Bacchi (1989) has argued that problem representation in policy - the likes of this panel's terms of reference - contains an implicit diagnosis of the solution. As Marston (2004: 93) puts it, 'The rationale for . . . reforms is constructed retrospectively to suit predetermined solutions, while at the same time contributing to the symbolic power of the State Government - a competent body of decision makers tackling hard . . . problems'. I want to suggest that the Expert Panel's terms of reference and its membership imply a heavily bounded solution; and indeed, a solution consistent with government's previous penchant for deterrence.
In considering the panel's description as 'expert', it is also useful to examine who or what was absent from its membership and/or its radar. If some correlation can be drawn between panel membership and outcomes, then the 'solution' to drownings was certainly not envisaged in terms of human rights practice, international law, or other pivotal areas of practice in the refugee field. For example, it would surely make sense to have included a human rights legal expert, given recent success of the High Court challenge to the Malaysia solution. The panel could also arguably have benefited from a candidate with knowledge and expertise of the push and pull factors in asylum. Or one with operational and political experience drawn from working in refugee camps. Here I am not making specific recommendations as to omissions; rather it is noteworthy to reflect on the symbolic and, ultimately, the political power of those omissions.
Presumably because it found areas of expertise or evidence unavailable to it, the panel recommended that 'that the incompleteness of the current evidence base on asylum issues be addressed through a well-managed and adequately funded research program engaging government and non-government expertise' (Rec 22). Funding for more comprehensive research is of course a welcome finding. However there has been little recognition from government or the panel of an already existing body of knowledge. Experts on refugee matters from the academy and from the community sector have worked hard to share their findings in respected journals and various popular and online media. It would be fair to suggest that the settlement services sector has increasingly been influenced by, and availed itself, of research and research practitioners. The Conversation recently advertised an initiative to collate relevant refugee research in a database. It is thus of concern that in assessing the relative influence of 'push' and 'pull' factors in asylum, the expert panel described its approach as 'more a matter of judgment than science'. All policy is premised on judgment, some moreso than others . However in a mature democracy one would hope that, amongst other sources of information, politicians would turn to their institutions of research and knowledge from which to garner evidence to inform their decisions. Not so where boat arrivals are at issue.
Recent governments have demonstrated an antipathy toward research from the sector where it conflicts with policy frameworks. I call this the 'Galileo effect'; that is, relevant research has at times been ignored, dismissed, or maligned when it does not conform with the hegemony of government policy. Take, for example, the work of Louise Newman, now Professor of Developmental Psychiatry and Director of the Monash University Centre for Developmental Psychiatry & Psychology. Professor Newman has spoken publicly about the pressure placed on her, and her colleagues, following their research into the negative mental health impacts of detention on asylum seekers (see for example Steel, ZP, Mares, S, Newman, L, Blick, B & Dudley, MJ, 2004) . Colleagues warned Newman that her field of study was the equivalent of career suicide. Her credibility and her methods of research were attacked during the term of the Howard government in a bid to undermine her findings. As Newman explained it, she was simply following the evidence; but, as Gore puts it, hers was an inconvenient truth. Consecutive governments have enthusiastically propagated disparaging representations of asylum seekers before seeking the facts or evidence (Riemer 2012). Throwing children into the water was a 'fact' until an inquiry drawing on meticulous research documented evidence to the contrary; although not until after Howard's re-election. Only this week there have been more unsubstantiated reports of aberrant asylum seeker behaviour. The inaccurate allegations were refuted and corrected by the captain of the relevant vessel. It would seem that only certain types of expertise are desirable where asylum seekers are concerned and sometimes, none at all.
Most regrettably, the voices of refugees are relatively absent from this debate, despite its serious implications for their lives (and possible deaths); both government and the sector must continue to meet the challenge of self reflection and reform in decision making practices which exclude the very people for whom they are acting 'in best interests'. Why was there not a former refugee on the panel? (Gillard has repeatedly referred to Aristotle as a refugee when he is not). Or one might ask a woman, given that most refugees globally are women and their children? Whose experience counts in the government's decision making process?
How else did expertise figure in this panel's decision making? We know that the panel received over 300 submissions from individuals and organisations, many of whom have significant experience and expertise in the refugee sector. A list of those consulted by the panel is included in the appendices. Much of this expertise arises from individuals and organisations who have direct engagement with refugee communities; people working at the coal face with individuals and families who, over the past fifteen years, have been living with the consequences of the prevailing 'solutions' of deterrence. An evidence base that arises from case management provides a chilling picture of the very human effects of policy making; such specific knowledge was of course also vested with the third member of the panel, Mr Paris Aristotle. The pivotal and vanguard services of Foundation House, which address the mental health needs of refugees, are a continuing legacy of Mr Aristotle's contribution to the sector. Given his experience, Mr Aristotle was much sought after by the media following delivery of the panel's controversial recommendations.
Despite his credentials, it would be inaccurate to suggest that Mr Aristotle's voice on the panel represented the preponderance of views from the sector. This is not to attack his motives, nor the drivers for his decision making (Gordon 2012). However the recommendations articulated in key refugee and human rights sector submissions (see for example ASRC, RILC, HRLC, RAN, etc) stand in stark contrast to the overwhelming number of panel recommendations; recommendations defended by Mr Aristotle. The absence of a submission to the panel from Foundation House, a key and long established refugee service provider, is also noteworthy. There could be no conflict of interest in such a submission, given the public nature of Aristotle's foundation role and directorship, and his being only one of a three member panel; although any contribution by Foundation House was unlikely to have materially affected the already bounded nature of the debate. The policy of deterrence was extended.
Appointment of the 'Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers' has proved a useful springboard from which to consider the issue of expertise and evidence in the asylum debate. Gillard's application of the term 'expert' to her panel was likely intended to convey a sense of 'competent' government tackling the 'hard problem' of boat people (Marston 2004); however the panel's regard for the current evidence base is unclear. It may well be that a greater body of evidence around refugee issues is required, for example in relation to refugee flows; however the evidence base around the affects of detention, for example, is already clear and compelling (APS 2012, AHRC 2012). One might be forgiven for thinking that the government tends to overlook expertise that does not suit its policy preferences (Riemer 2012). In the case of the Expert Panel, government has structured a process likely to deliver a solution of its anticipation; because frankly, to frame an inquiry in relation to preventing boat journeys, and then to resource it primarily with a defence and security expert, is to imply the solution to the problem (Bacchi 1999). Gillard may have appointed a panel with expertise, but its recommendations, by and large, did not reflect expert views from the sector.
